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Abstract
In agent communication languages, the inferences that
can be made on the basis of a communicative action are
inherently conditional, and non-monotonic. For exam-
ple, a proposal only leads to a commitment, on the con-
dition that it is accepted. And in a persuasion dialogue,
assertions may later be retracted. In this paper we there-
fore present a defeasible logic that can be used to express
a semantics for agent communication languages, and to
efficiently make inferences on the basis of communica-
tive actions. The logic is non-monotonic, allows nested
rules and mental attitudes as the content of communica-
tive actions, and has an explicit way of expressing per-
sistence over time. Moreover, it expresses that mental
attitudes are publicly attributed to agents playing roles
in the dialogue. To illustrate the usefulness of the logic,
we reformalize the meta-theory underlying the FIPA se-
mantics for agent communication, focusing on inform
and propose. We show how composed speech acts can
be formalized, and extend the semantics with an account
of persuasion.
1 Introduction
Whereas FIPA speech act syntax (FIPA [2002]) is widely used in
agent programming and communication languages, the FIPA se-
mantics based on mental attitudes has not been adopted by the
agent community at large. For example, if agent a informs agent
b that there is a price reduction, then the FIPA semantics implies
that agent a believes that there is such a price reduction, together
with various other conditions. It is generally accepted that such as-
sumptions hinder the use of FIPA semantics in various ways, see,
e.g., Wooldridge [2000]. First, FIPA semantics can not be verified
given common assumptions about open agent systems. Second, the
sincerity condition that is assumed in FIPA may be acceptable in
cooperative circumstances, but is clearly wrong for persuasion and
negotiation dialogues.
During the last years, two ways of dealing with the flaws in the
semantics have been discussed. First, it has been suggested that
FIPA speech act semantics can be reinterpreted in terms of social
attitudes, for example Verdicchio and Colombetti [2006] model
FIPA speech acts using the notion of commitment introduced by
Singh [2000]. Second, other works reinterpret FIPA semantics in
terms of public mental attitudes instead of private ones, trying to
preserve its main characteristics. Gaudou et al. [2006a,b] use the
notion of common ground, Nickles et al. [2006] refer to ostensi-
ble beliefs and goals and Boella et al. [2006a,b] introduce roles.
This substitution makes it possible to substantially maintain FIPA
semantics without incurring in the verifiability problems.
However, these solutions do not address two other problems of
FIPA’s semantics:
• FIPA semantics does not specify how an agent adopting it has
to deal with the many non-monotonic aspects inherent in com-
municative actions.
• FIPA semantics does not consider the rule-based character of
communication and the conditional nature of mental attitudes
of agents using it.
In an agent communication many inferences can be made only
in absence of specific information and tentatively, because they can
later be retracted or revised when new pieces of information be-
come available. In particular, FIPA does not specify how agents
have to deal with the persistence of preconditions and effects of
speech acts, and with retraction. Persistence must be intended in
two senses. Effects of speech acts persist in the future. However,
they persist only as far as the are not cancelled. For example a goal
can be cancelled because it has been satisfied, or a belief can be
retracted. Inferences about the preconditions persist also towards
the past, since they are observations and not caused by the speech
act. E.g., it is possible to infer that the speaker believes what he
asserted, and, unless other information are available, he believed
this also in the past and keeps believing it.
Retraction of speech acts is another non-monotonic mechanism
disregarded by FIPA since the standard is focused to cooperative
dialogues only, and not towards persuasion or negotiation dia-
logues.
Last, strict inferences about effects and preconditions of speech
acts are only possible in the public beliefs or goals of the partici-
pants, while in the real private beliefs or goals of the participants
on the dialogue can be made only by default, under the assumption
of cooperativity or sincerity.
Concerning the rule-based character of dialogue, consider the
semantics of a proposal. When agent a proposes a contract α to
agent b, this means that, if agent b also publically adopts the goal
α , i.e. accepts the proposal, then agent a will adopt this goal too.
So when agent b accepts the proposal, by informing agent a that
it has adopted α as a goal, then agent a will be publically bound
to this goal. We use nested rules to describe how a communicative
act implies such a rule.
We therefore introduce in this paper a defeasible logic to reason
about the speech act semantics to study the non-monotonic and
rule-based character of role based communicative actions. The
defeasible logic combines a variety of recent results in defeasible
logic to incorporate multiple agents, nested modalities, time with
persistence (Governatori et al. [2005]), nested conditionals (Song
and Governatori [2005]) and the introduction of roles in a dialogue
game. At the same time defeasible logic aims to respect the linear
complexity of the basic defeasible logic, so we can consider the
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resource constraints of agents which use FIPA semantics.
Our requirements for a logic of role based agent communication
are that it can formalize the essential features of FIPA semantics us-
ing public mental states, including composed actions, it can be ex-
tended to reason about different assumptions about agents in coop-
erative dialogues, like information exchange, and non-cooperative
dialogues, like persuasion and negotiation.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the defeasible logic we use. In Section 3 we formalize and extend
FIPA speech acts, and we show how to reason about the agent’s
mental attitudes.
2 Defeasible Logic
This section proposes an extension of Defeasible Logic (DL) (An-
toniou et al. [2000]) to deal with FIPA dialogues. The next section
illustrates the definitions by examples in role based agent commu-
nication. We keep the basic distinction among strict and defeasible
rules, and defeaters. We have that φ → ψ is a strict rule such
that whenever the premises φ are indisputable so is the conclusion
ψ . φ ⇒ ψ is a defeasible rule that can be defeated by contrary
evidence. φ ; ψ is a defeater that is used to defeat some defea-
sible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. We extend the
language with temporal dimension, mental states (beliefs B and
goals G), one level of nested rules, and speech acts.
Definition 1 (Language) Let PROP be a set of propositional
atoms,AA a set of atomic acts,Ag andRole the finite sets of agents
and roles, and T a discrete totally ordered set of instants of time
{t1, t2, . . .}. MOD, TPROP, etc., are the smallest sets closed under
the following rules:
modal operators MOD=
⋃
i∈Ag∪Role{Bi,Gi};
temporal prop. atoms TPROP= {p : t|p ∈ PROP, t ∈T };
temporal literals Lit= TPROP∪{¬p|p ∈ TPROP}.
modal temporal literals for any Xi ∈ MOD, (1) (Xil) : t,¬(Xil) :
t ∈ ModLit for l ∈ Lit; (2) if m in ModLit, then Xi(m) :
t,¬Xi(m) : t ∈ModLit.
If q : t is a temporal literal, ∼q : t denotes the complementary
literal (if q : t is a positive literal p : t then ∼q : t is ¬p :
t; and if q : t is ¬p : t, then ∼q : t is p : t). If p is modal
temporal literal Xi(q) : t, then the set of its complementary
literals p∼ is the smallest set closed under the following rules:
(1) ¬Xi(q) : t,Xi(¬q) : t ∈ p∼ for q ∈ Lit; (2) if m in ModLit,
then ¬Xi(m) : t,Xi(¬m) : t ∈ p∼; in this case ∼p will denote
any element of the set p∼. For readability we also write pt for
p : t and X ti (m) for Xi(m) : t.
speech act types ST = {inform,promise, . . .}
temporal speech acts if st ∈ ST , i, j ∈ Ag∪Role, s ∈ Rul, t ∈ T ,
then sti, j(s, t) ∈ SA
acts ACTS= AA∪SA∪{¬a | a ∈ AA∪SA}
atomic persistent rules Rulatom,pi is:
Rulatom,pi = {(φ pi ψ) : t|φ ⊆ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS,
ψ ∈ Lit∪ModLit, ∈ {→,⇒,;}, t ∈T }
atomic transient rules
Rulatom,τ = {(φ τ ψ) : t|φ ⊆ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS,
ψ ∈ ACTS∪Lit∪ModLit, ∈ {→,⇒,;}, t ∈T }
atomic rules Rulatom is Rulatom,pi ∪Rulatom,τ .
non-modal rules NRul= Rulatom∪{¬r|r ∈ Rulatom}
modal rules for any Xi ∈ MOD, (1) Xir,¬Xir ∈ MRul for r ∈
NRul; (2) if r in MRul, then Xir,¬Xir ∈ MRul. The defini-
tions of complementary rules and complementary modal rules
is similar to those for complementary literals and complemen-
tary modal literals.
rules Rul= NRul∪MRul.
meta-rules RulC:
RulC = {φ pi ψ : t|φ ⊆ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS∪Rul,
ψ ∈ Rul, ∈ {→,⇒,;}, t ∈T }
abbreviations: if r is any rule, A(r) denotes the antecedent of r
while C(r) denotes its consequent. Other abbreviations are used,
such as subscript for type of rule (persistent vs transient) or for
the strength (strict, defeasible, defeater), and R[φ ] for rules whose
consequent is φ ; for example:
Ruls = {φ → ψ ∈ Rul} Ruld = {φ ⇒ ψ ∈ Rul}
Rulsd = {φ ψ ∈ Rul| ∈ {→,⇒}} Ruldft = {φ ; ψ ∈ Rul}
Rulpi [ψ] = {r ∈ Rulpi |C(r) = ψ}
For readability reasons sometimes we will use φ t ψ instead of
φ ψ : t.
Remark 1 The language is built up by introducing different basic
components: temporal literals, modal temporal literals, and tem-
poral speech acts. In all cases, the components are labelled by
time instants. Facts, such as It Rains : t is an example of temporal
literal, where t is a time instant. Modal literals have two temporal
dimensions, as we want to express the fact that an agent can believe
(or have a goal) at a certain time: Bti It Rains : t
′, for example, says
that agent i believes at t that it rains at t ′. Speech acts, too, embed
temporal dimensions, the time when the speech act is performed
plus the time of the literal in the scope of the speech act operator.
We have different types of rule that we can build using the men-
tioned basic components. Besides the usual distinction among de-
feasible, strict rules, and defeaters, we can work with persistent and
transient rules. In addition, rules can be temporalized; the tempo-
ral parameter t applied to an entire rule r, such as in the case r : (a :
t ′⇒ b : t ′′) : t, indicates the time from when such a rule holds. Per-
sistent rules, whose arrow is labelled by pi , are such that the conclu-
sions we derive from them persist over time until the opposite con-
clusion blocks the derivation: r : (It Rains : t ′→pi Bta It Rains : t′) :
t ′′, for example, says that, if it rains at t ′, then it is a definite con-
clusion that agent a believes at t that it rains at t ′ and this belief
persists for every time instant next to t; such a rule r holds from
t ′′ onwards. Transient rules, labelled by τ , state conclusions co-
occurrent with their premises: r′ : (Church : t⇒τ Gta[Pray : t]) : t ′,
which says that when in a church at t, agent a, defeasibly, has
the goal at t to pray at t, being the rule r′ valid from t ′ onwards.
When rules occur within the scope of a modal operator we obtain
modal rules: Bt
′
b (It Rains : t ⇒τ Gta[Open Umbrella : t]), which
states that agent a believes at t ′ that, if it rains at t, agent b has the
goal at t to open at that time the umbrella.
Finally, the language permits to introduce meta-
rules, namely, rules whose consequents are other rules
among those we mentioned above. For example:
r : (informa,b(It Rains : t′ ⇒ GaOpen Umbrella, t) →pi
(Bta[It Rains : t
′] ⇒ GaOpen Umbrella) : t) : t ′′, which states
the from the point of view t ′′ if agent a informs b about rule, then
from time t, the rule Bta[It Rains : t
′] ⇒ GaOpen Umbrella) will
hold from time t. For readability, when rules have no external
temporal parameter this means that they hold from t0 onwards.
Definition 2 (Defeasible ACL theory) A defeasible ACL theory
for some dialogue type d, such as information seeking, is a tuple
(T ,F,Ag,Roled ,r,Rd ,RCd ,d), where
• T is a discrete totally ordered set of times {t1, t2, . . .};
• F ⊆ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS is a finite set of facts,
• Ag = {a,b, ..} is a set of agents, Roled = {r1,r2, ..} a set of
roles, and r is a dialogue instance which determines a func-
tion r : Ag 7→ Roled ,
• Rd ⊆ Rul and RCd ⊆ RulC are the rules for d, and
• d⊆ (Rul×Rul)∪(RC×RC) the priority relation for d, which
is an acyclic binary relation over the set of rules.
2.1 Proof theory
DL is based on a constructive inference mechanism based on
tagged conclusions. A tagged conclusion has one of the follow-
ing (basic) forms
• +∆p (−∆p), meaning that we have (we can show that we do
not have) a definite derivation for p; a definite derivation is
derivation obtained using only facts and strict rules.
• +∂ p (−∂ p), meaning that we have (we can show that we do
not have) a defeasible derivation of p.
Rules are partitioned into persistent and transient rules according to
whether, respectively, the consequent persists until an interrupting
event occurs, or it is temporally co-occurrent with the premises.
Thus, proof tags ∂ and ∆ can be labelled with pi or τ . Second,
since rules can be temporalized (indicating the time of their valid-
ity, their “viewpoint”), the conclusions we infer from them can be
temporalized as well in this sense: using an applicable rule holding
at t, we write, e.g., +∂@t q meaning that q is defeasibly provable
with viewpoint t, i.e., using the rules that are derivable (in force
or effective) at t. When proof tags are not labelled, we generically
refer to any type of proof tag. Analogously, when no viewpoint is
specified in proof tags, the conclusion has been obtained with an
“untimed” rule, which implicitly holds at any times.
Definition 3 (Derivation) Given a defeasible ACL theory D, a
derivation P from D is a finite sequence P(1), . . . ,P(n) of tagged
conclusions ±#p, where # ∈ {∆,∂}, p ∈ Lit ∪ModLit ∪ Rul ∪
ACTS, and where each P(i) = ±#p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n satisfies the proof
conditions (based on the elements of D) given in the rest of this
section.
With P(1..n) we denote the initial subsequence P of length n. As
usual we will use D ` ±#p to denote that there is a derivation P
from D of ±#p.
Definition 4 If D = (T ,F,Ag,Role,R,RC,) is an ACL
theory, the rule-range is R = R ∪ R′ of D such that
R′ = {r|r ∈C(r′),r′ ∈ RC}.
Definition 4 provides the rule-range which is considered when we
prove a literal or a rule. For example, when we defeasibly prove
a literal, we have to find an applicable rule r whose consequent
is such a literal, and check that all rules that provide the opposite
conclusion are defeated or cannot be applied. These rules, r and
the “attacking rules”, can be in theory from the beginning (in R),
or can be derived using appropriate meta-rules. R is the domain
that include them.
Definition 5 Let i, j ∈ {a,b,r(a),r(b)}, # ∈ {∆,∂}, and P =
(P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a proof in D.
• A rule r : t ∈R is #-applicable-at-t ′ in P iff
– r : t ∈Ratom, and
– +#Cpi@t ′r : t ∈ P(1..n), and
– ∀p ∈ A(r), +#@t ′p ∈ P(1..n);
• A rule r : t ∈R is #-discarded-at-t ′ in P iff either
– r : t =∼r′ : t for some r′ : t ∈ R, or
– r : t ∈MRul, or
– −#Cpi@t ′r : t ∈ P(1..n), or
– ∃p ∈ A(r) such that −#@t ′p ∈ P(1..n).
Definition 5 states the conditions of applicability for basic rules
(i.e., rules which are not meta-rules). A rule r is applicable at a time
t ′ if: (1) r does not have the form ¬(a b); the negation of a rule
cannot be used to derive any literal; (2) r is derivable at t, namely
it not defeated, otherwise it cannot be used; (3) all antecedents of r
must be provable. If these conditions are not met, r is not applica-
ble (it is discarded) at t ′. An additional condition for discarding r is
that it has the form X(ab) (X ∈ {B,G}), namely, it is modalized:
only when we admit –as we do in the next sections– that rules such
as Br(a)[p→ Gr(a)qt ] can be transformed into Br(a)p→ Gr(a)qt we
can apply them (see Definition 8).
Let us focus on proof conditions. For space reasons, we provide
only proof conditions for positive persistent conclusions. Condi-
tions for transient conclusions roughly follow the inference pat-
terns of standard DL. The negative proof condition can be obtained
from the positive one by applying the principle of strong negation
(Antoniou et al. [2000]), i.e., the negative proof conditions are con-
structive conditions showing that it is not possible to satisfy the
corresponding positive proof condition.
The inference conditions for positive persistent definite proofs
of literals and modal literals are as follows.
+∆pi : If P(n+1) = +∆pi@t ′q : t, then
(1) q : t ∈ F ; or
(2) ∃r ∈Rpi,s[q : t]: r is ∆-applicable-at-t ′; or
(3) ∃t ′′ ∈T :t ′ < t, +∆pi@t ′q : t ′′ ∈ P(1..n); or
(4) ∃t ′′′ ∈T : t ′′′ < t, +∆pi@t ′′′q : t ∈ P(1..n).
Remark 2 A temporal literal or a temporal modal literal q : t is
strictly provable with the viewpoint t ′ in a theory when (1) q : t is
a fact (and, as such, it is assumed to hold for every viewpoint); (2)
strict rules in D can be applied one after the other and the chain of
reasoning arrives at a persistent rule which is applicable at t ′ and
that has as a consequent q : t; (3) q : t ′′ is strictly and persistently
provable with the viewpoint t ′; since q is persistent, it holds for
any instants subsequent to t ′′, and so at t; (4) q : t has been proved
for a viewpoint t ′′ preceding the current viewpoint t ′. Here is an
example of the last two cases:
F = {a : t2}
R= {r1 : (a : t2 →τ b : t1) : t1
r2 : (b : t1 →pi q : t3) : t1}
t3 < t, t1 < t
We want to know whether +∆@tq : t, i.e., whether q holds at t,
when we consider the evidence and rules that hold at t (the time at
which we consider the derivation, @t). The fact makes r1 applica-
ble and so we obtain +∆τ@t1 b : t1. This makes r2 applicable and,
since r2 is persistent and t3≤ t,+∆pi@t1 q : t, and then+∆pi@t q : t.
Hence, +∆@t q : t.
The inference conditions for positive persistent defeasible proofs
are as follows.
+∂pi : If P(n+1) = +∂pi@txq : t then
(1) +∆pi@txq : t ∈ P(1..n), or
(2) −∆@tx ∼q : t ∈ P(1..n), and
(2.1) ∃r : tr ∈Rpi,sd [q : t]: r is ∂ -applicable-at-tx, and
(2.2) ∀s : ts ∈R[∼q : t]: if +∂Cpi @tx s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then either
(2.2.1) s : ts is ∂ -discarded-at-tx; or
(2.2.2) ∃w : tw ∈Rpi [q : t]: w is ∂ -applicable-at-tx and
w : tw  s : ts; or
(3) ∃t ′ ∈T : t ′ < t and +∂pi@tx q : t ′ ∈ P(1..n), and
(3.1) ∀t ′′, t ′ < t ′′ ≤ t, ∀s : ts ∈R[∼q : t ′′]:
if +∂Cpi @tx s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
(3.1.1) s : ts is ∂ -discarded-at-tx or
(3.1.2) ∃v : tv ∈ Rpi [q : t ′], v is ∂ -applicable-at-tx and
v : tv  s : ts; or
(4) ∃t ′′′ ∈T : t ′′′ < tx and +∂pi@t ′′′q : t ∈ P(1..n), and
(4.1) ∀t ′′′′ t ′′′ < t ′′′′ ≤ tx ∀s : ts ∈R[∼q : t]:
if +∂Cpi @tx s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
(4.1.1) s is ∂ -discarded-at-tx or
(4.1.2) ∃v : tv ∈ RX [q : t ′′′]: v is ∂ -applicable-at-tx and
v : tv  s : ts.
Remark 3 Proof conditions for defeasible persistent literals runs
as follows. In general, notice that each time a rule is used, this
requires that it is applicable, which in turn requires, among other
conditions, that it is derivable. Clause 1 allows us to infer a defea-
sible persistent conclusion from a strict persistent conclusion with
the same mode. Clause 2 requires that the complement of the literal
we want to prove is not definitely provable (or definitely provable
for−∂ ), but it does not specify whether it is persistent or transient:
remember that what we want to achieve is to see whether the lit-
eral or its complement are provable at t but not both; in the same
way, and for the same reason, q can be attacked by any rule for the
complement of q (clause 2.2). An important issue in all clauses of
this proof condition is that each time we have to use a rule (either
to support the conclusion (2.1), to attack it (2.2.1) or to rebut the
attack (2.2.2)) we must have that the rule is provable at time t of
the derivation (@t). Clauses 3 and 4 are the clauses implementing
persistence (i.e., the conclusion has been derived at a previous time
and carries over to the current time). Essentially clause 3 ensures
that the conclusion has been derived at a previous time t ′′ and no
interrupting event occurred between t ′′ and t; while clause 4 takes
care of the case where q is derived persistently for a time before t ′,
and that no interrupting event will occur between the effectiveness
of q and the time q is expected to hold according to the current
derivation. Let us see a small example:
F = {a : t ′′, p : t ′′}
R= {r1 : (a : t ′′⇒pi q : t) : t ′
r2 : (b : t ′′⇒τ ¬q : t ′′′) : t ′
r3 : (p : t ′′⇒pi s : t ′′′′) : t ′′′′
r4 : (p : t ′′⇒pi b : t ′′) : t ′
r5 : (s : t ′⇒pi ¬b : t ′′) : t ′}
= {r5  r4}
t ′′′′ < t ′
The facts make applicable r1, r3, r4, and r5. r4, in particular, would
permit to make r2 applicable, which would attack r1, as we do not
know whether it is stronger than r2. However, r5 is stronger than
r4, which permit to discard r2. In fact, r5 is applicable thanks to r3,
from which we obtain+∂pi@t ′′′′s : t ′′′′. By persistency (with regard
to the viewpoint and the time of the consequent s; clauses 3 and 4)
we get +∂pi@t ′s : t ′, which, as we said, makes r5 applicable.
The proof conditions for transient rules have the same struc-
ture as the corresponding proof conditions for permanent rules but
without the persistence conditions. Namely the condition for +∆τ
is the same as the first two conditions of +∆pi , while the condition
for +∂τ corresponds to clauses (1) to (2) of +∂pi .
Definition 6 Two rules r : t,s : t ′ ∈ Rul are incompatible iff
1. t = t ′ and
2. r =∼s, or
3. A(r) = A(s) and C(r) =∼C(s).
Two modal rules X(r) : t,Y (s) : t ′ ∈MRul, such that r,s ∈ Rul, are
incompatible iff t = t ′ and either
1. X = Y , and r and s are incompatible; or
2. Y = ¬Y , and r = r′.
Given two rules r and s, we write r  s to denote that s and r are
incompatible and s is at least as strong as r, where the strength
of rules is such that strict rules are stronger than defeasible rules
and defeaters, and defeasible rules and defeaters have the same
strength.
Definition 6 states the incompatibility conditions between rules,
namely, the criteria to see when the derivations of two rules are
in conflict. For non-modal rules, they are incompatible when (1)
they have the same external time of validity, and, either (2) one is
the negation of the other, or (3) they have the same antecedents,
but one has, as its consequent, the complement of the consequent
of the other. Two modal rules are incompatible when, having the
same external time of validity, they have the same modality and the
rules in the scope of the modal operator are incompatible, or one is
the negation of the other.
Definition 7 Let # ∈ {∆,∂}, and P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a proof
in D.
• A rule r ∈ RC is #-applicable-at-t ′ in P iff ∀p ∈ A(r)
– if p ∈ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS, +#@t ′p ∈ P(1..n);
– if p ∈R, +#C@t ′r ∈ P(1..n).
• A rule r :∈ RC is #-discarded-at-t ′ in P iff ∃p ∈ A(r) such that
– if p ∈ Lit∪ModLit∪ACTS, −#@t ′p ∈ P(1..n);
– if p ∈R, −#C@t ′r ∈ P(1..n).
Applicability conditions for meta-rules (Definition 7) are intuitive.
A meta-rule is applicable when its antecedent is provable and the
rule is derivable.
Let us now state the positive definite proof procedures for de-
riving rules using meta-rules. Remember that we assumed to work
only with persistent meta-rules.
+∆Cpi : If P(n+1) = +∆Cpi@t ′r : tr, then
(1) r : tr ∈ R, or
(2) ∃r′ ∈ RCpi,s[r : tr]: r′ is ∆-applicable-at-t ′; or
(3) ∃t ′′ ∈T : t ′′ < t, +∆Cpi@t ′r : t ′′ ∈ P(1..n); or
(4) ∃t ′′ ∈T : t ′′′ < t ′, +∆Cpi@t ′′′r : t ∈ P(1..n).
Remark 4 Strict persistent derivations of rules are based on the
use of meta-rules, namely, rules in RC. These proof conditions
obey the same criteria of strict persistent derivations of literals (see
Remark 2 for a detailed comment). The main difference is that
we do not have that r ∈ RX is a condition for definitely deriving r.
This happens because the mere inclusion of a rule r in the set of
rules of a theory does not exclude that r be attacked by a meta-rule
permitting to derive another rule which is incompatible with r.
Defeasible derivations of persistent rules using persistent meta-
rules are as follows.
+∂Cpi : If P(n+1) = +∂Cpi @t ρ : tr, then
(1) +∆Cpi@t r : tr ∈ P(1..n), or
(2) ∀z ∈R such that z : tz  r : tr, −∆@t z : tz ∈ P(1..n), and
(2.1) ∃s ∈ RC[r : tr], and s is ∂ -applicable at t and
(2.2) ∀v ∈ RC[x : tx], x : tx  r : tr either
v is ∂ -discarded at t or s v; or
(3) ∃t ′ ∈T , t ′ < tr, +∂Cpi @t r : t ′ and ∀t ′′ ∈T , t ′ < t ′′ < tr,
∀s ∈ RC[x : tx], x : tx  r : tr either s is ∂ -discarded at t or ts < tr; or
(4) ∃t ′′ ∈T , t ′′ < t, +∂Cpi @t ′′ r : tr and ∀t ′′′ ∈T , t ′′ < t ′′′ < t,
∀s ∈ RC[x : tx], x : tx  r : tr either s is ∂ -discarded at t ′′ or ts < tr.
Remark 5 Defeasible persistent derivations obey the same criteria
of defeasible persistent derivations of literals (see Remark 3 for a
detailed comment). The main difference is that conflicts here are
based on the notion of incompatibility (see Definition 6).
Proposition 1 Let D be an acyclic ACL theory (i.e., a theory where
the transitive closure of the superiority relation is acyclic); then for
every # ∈ {∆,∂}:
• for no p it is the case that both D `+#p and D ` −#p;
• if D `+∂ p and D `+∂∼p, then D `+∆p and D `+∆∼p.
The above proposition shows the soundness of the logic in the
sense that it is both consistent and coherent. i.e., it is not possi-
ble to derive a tagged conclusion and its opposite, and that we can-
not defeasibly prove both p and its complementary unless the strict
part of the theory prove them; this means that inconsistency can be
derived only if the theory we started with is inconsistent, and even
in this case the logic does not collapse to the trivial extensions (i.e.,
everything is provable).
While it is possible to show “soundness” of the logic as we have
explained above, completeness needs a semantics. It is possible
to give an argumentation semantics for basic DL (Governatori et
al. [2004]) and extensions of the semantics have been proposed for
temporalised defeasible logic. In addition Antoniou et al. [2006]
proposed a semantic characterisation of defeasible logic in terms
of Kunen semantics. We believe it is possible to extend this char-
acterisation to cover the logic presented here, but we believe that
this kind of work, while valuable to understand the computational
properties of the logic and to establish relationships with other for-
malism, does not contribute to the intuitive understanding of the
logic. This would provide a different type of computation to the
logic. Instead of combinatorial means one could use set-theoretic
notions.
3 Reasoning about FIPA Semantics
In this section we show how the defeasible logic of Section 2, can
be applied as a kind of meta-language, to express the semantics of
an agent communication language, and to make inferences about
communicative acts. For ease of reference, we take FIPA [2002]
semantics as a starting point.
In FIPA, communicative acts are defined in terms of rational ef-
fects (RE) and feasibility preconditions (FP). The rational effect
is the mental state the speaker wants to bring about in the hearer,
and the feasibility preconditions encode the appropriate conditions
for issuing a communicative act. For instance, here is the FIPA
definition of the inform communicative act:
〈a, inform(b, p)〉 FP: B(a, p)∧¬B(a,B(b, p)∨B(b,¬p))
RE: B(b, p)
As a feasibility precondition speaker a must believe what he says
and he must not believe that hearer b already has an opinion on the
conveyed proposition. The rational effect agent a wants to achieve
is that hearer b comes to believe p.
Planning operators like this can be used L for enabling agents
to generate a dialogue, but they can also be used in the interpreta-
tion of the utterances of the interlocutor. In the FIPA framework,
this methodology relies on axioms (Property 4 and 5) according to
which, when a communicative act is executed, its feasibility pre-
conditions are assumed to be true, and its rational effect is wanted
by the speaker1.
1In FIPA notation, act stands for any action, done(act) is the proposi-
tion that expresses completion of act, and agent(b,act) represents that b
is the agent who executes action act.
B(a,done(act)→ FP(act))
B(a,done(act)∧agent(b,act))→ G(b,RE(act)))
However, FIPA does not specify some important aspects of com-
municative acts: persistence, roles, and the rule-based character of
dialogue.
Persistence. FIPA does not specify how to deal with the persis-
tence of preconditions and effects of communicative acts. In the
case of the above inform, hearer b can infer not only that the pre-
condition that a believes p is true at the moment of execution of
the communicative act, b can also infer that this precondition held
before the communicative act, and will hold afterwards. However,
these inferences have a defeasible character, since a can later re-
tract the inform.
Concerning rational effects, not only can effects persist towards
the future, but they can also be successful or not, which does not
only depend on the speaker. FIPA does not allow explicitly to make
inferences about the success of a rational effect, even though in-
formally the FIPA specification (p.10) says: “Whether or not the
receiver does, indeed, adopt belief in the proposition will be a
function of the receiver’s trust in the sincerity and reliability of
the sender.” Nevertheless, in many circumstances the speaker can
in fact attribute to the hearer the proposition he has asserted. For
example, in collaborative situations when he knows that the hearer
considers him reliable, or in persuasion dialogues when the hearer
does not challenge the inform.
Roles. Strict inferences about effects and preconditions of com-
municative acts are only possible regarding the public beliefs or
goals of the participants (if at all), while inferences about the pri-
vate beliefs of the participants can be made only by default, under
the assumption of cooperativity, trust or sincerity. It is not possi-
ble to model a dialogue on the basis of private beliefs and goals
only, since in many situations dialogue goes on correctly, even if
the participants are not cooperative, sincere or do not trust each
other.
We adopt Boella et al. [2006a,b]’s role-based approach to agent
communication, where mental attitudes are publicly attributed to
dialogue participants, and can only change according to the rules
of the dialogue. Public beliefs and goals represent the expected
behavior of an agent, hence they are called a role. Each dialogue
is associated with a set of roles to index the public mental attitudes
of the participants. Besides the fact that the verifiability problem
is solved, in this way, each participant can engage in different di-
alogues at the same time by playing different roles, and dialogues
can obey different kinds of rules associated with each role. For
example, in a persuasion dialogue, the proponent of a proposition
can have a different ‘burden of proof’ than the opponent.
In the rules below, the beliefs and goals are therefore attributed
to the roles (e.g., Br(a)), and not only to the individual agents (e.g.,
Ba). Attitudes of individual agents can be unknown, or can be dif-
ferent from the attitudes publicly attributed to their roles. Using DL
we can connect public and private attitudes in a defeasible manner.
Rule-based character. Defeasible logic is based on rules. Thus,
it allows us to model the conditional nature of mental attitudes in
a natural way. Consider for example a goal like: “I want to go
to the cinema, if it is raining”. Moreover, the logic can handle
the conditional nature of communicative acts. For example, the
semantics of a proposal can be expressed by a rule of the form “I
want to execute what I proposed, if the proposal is accepted” (see
Section 3.3).
The conditional nature of mental attitudes introduces some com-
plexities. For example, FIPA assumes introspection on beliefs and
goals (p.31): B(a,B(a, p)) ≡ B(a, p) and B(a,G(a, p)) ≡ G(a, p)
require nesting of mental attitudes. Moreover, the content of a
communicative act or modal operator, can be a rule itself. The no-
tation B[.] or G[.] takes care of such nested occurrences of modal
operators, and rules. For example, Ba[p→ Gaqt ] becomes Bap→
Gaqt (an agent is correct about its own goals) and Ga[p→Gbqt ] is
updated to Gap→ GaGbqt (the rule is embedded in a goal of a).
Definition 8 Let M be a modal literal, X a modal operator.
X [M] ≡M, if M = XM′ or (X = Bti and M = GtiM′),
XM otherwise.
X [M1M2] ≡ X [M1]X [M2], for ∈ {→,⇒,;}
In the rest of the section we will introduce set of rules formalis-
ing the preconditions and the effects of speech act. These rules are
intended to be general rules for the relative speech acts. As such
the rules are assumed to be valid from the begin of the interaction
among the agents. Thus all these rules will be valid from a time
t0 coinciding with the origin of T , which in turn corresponds to
the start of the computation for an agent interaction. For the sake
of readability, given the above assumption, we will omit the time
instant (t0) associated with all these rules.
3.1 Inform
The constitutive rules Rinf = {i1, ..., i13} define the meaning of an
inform communicative act, for a standard type of cooperative di-
alogue, like information exchange. In Section 3.5 we consider a
non-cooperative version of these rules.
In the following rules, a,b are agents, r is a dialogue instance
of cooperative type, r(a) and r(b) the role-playing-agents in the
dialogue, inform is a communicative act type, s is a rule, and t < t ′
are time points in T . The rules have priority i2  i1, i9  i8, i11 
i10 and i13  i12.
Rule i1 describes how an inform act is performed by an agent a
through an utterance event. The rule is defeasible since the com-
municative act can be retracted later, as indicated in rule i2. Obvi-
ously, there are different ways of handling retraction. The solution
here is to withdraw the original communicative act by means of a
defeater rule. Because of the way the defeasible logic is set-up,
that means that all the consequences that can be inferred from the
act, expressed in rules i3− i6, are also withdrawn. If we would
take the alternative solution of only retracting the content of the
inform, we would need additional explicit rules to withdraw those
consequences too.
i1 uttera,b,r(inform,s, t)⇒τ informr(a),r(b)(s, t)
i2 retracta,b,r(informr(a),r(b)(s, t), t ′)
 τ ¬informr(a),r(b)(s, t)
Note that the agent of actions utter and retract is the individual
agent a and not its role r(a). Rules i1, i2 are used to connect indi-
vidual agents to their roles. Note furthermore that these rules are
non-persistent, since the action of uttering only temporally coin-
cides with execution of an inform communicative act.
Rules i3− i5 represent the preconditions of making an inform.
Following FIPA Properties 4 and 5, they are interpreted as strict
rules. In contrast, the effect should persist non-monotonically.
Only rule i3 is persistent towards the future, since the inform pos-
sibly changes the beliefs of the hearer b.
The consequents of precondition rules should persist also to the
past, since they are observations and not caused by the speech acts.
We do not have the space to cope with this issue.
i3 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)→pi Btr(a)[s]
i4 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)→τ ¬Bt−1r(b)[s]
i5 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)→τ ¬Bt−1r(b)[¬s]
Note that the consequent of the rule has the form Btr(a)[s] as in
Definition 8, and not Btr(a)(s), since s is a rule too.
Rule i6 represents the rational effect of the inform: the proposi-
tional content of the inform is embedded in a goal of the speaker
that the hearer believes it.
i6 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)→pi Gtr(a)[Btr(b)[s]]
FIPA does not allow explicit inferences about the success of the ra-
tional effect, but in our model of cooperative information exchange
Rinfo, rule i7 can represent that the hearer publicly adopts the infor-
mation conveyed, if he believes that the speaker is reliable.
i7 Gtr(a)[B
t
r(b)[s]]∧Btr(b)reliable(a)→pi Btr(b)[s]
This does not necessarily mean that the hearer privately believes
what was said. Only if there is no evidence to the contrary, we
assume that individual agents believe what their roles believe (i8-
i13). Rule i8 assumes that the speaker individually believes what
he says, unless he is believed to be insincere (i9). Rule i10 assumes
that a hearer believes what has been asserted, unless he is believed
not to be a trusting character (i11). Rule i12 assumes sincerity for
goals in a similar way. In all these cases, the cooperative behavior
is the default, but it can be overruled by evidence to the contrary.
Hence we have i9  i10, i11  i10 and i13  i12.
i8 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)⇒pi Bta[s]
i9 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)¬sincere(a) pi ¬Bta[s]
i10 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)[s]⇒pi Btb[s]
i11 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)[s]∧Btr(a)¬trusting(b)
 pi ¬Btb[s]
i12 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Gtr(a)[Btr(b)[s]]⇒pi Gta[Btb[s]]
i13 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)¬sincere(a) pi ¬Gta[Bta[s]]
3.2 Request
Analogously to inform, we define the preconditions and effects of
a request communicative act, used in deliberation dialogues, by
rules Rreq = {r1, . . . ,r13}, with priority r2  r1, r7  r6 , r9  r8,
r11  r10 and r13  r12. For space reasons, we do not explicitly
model preconditions of actions in AA, so compared to FIPA, we
have to simplify the definitions. Again, the cooperative behav-
ior is the default, which is overruled when the agent refuses the
request, or when there is evidence that the agent is insincere, or
non-cooperative.
r1 uttera,b,r(request,s, t)⇒τ requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)
r2 retracta,b,r(requestr(a),r(b)(s, t), t ′)
 τ ¬requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)
r3 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)→pi Gtr(a)[s]
r4 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)→τ ¬Gt−1r(b)[s]
r5 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)→pi Gtr(a)[Gtr(b)[s]]
r6 Gtr(a)[G
t
r(b)[s]]⇒pi Gtr(b)[s]
r7 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧ refuser(b),r(a)(s, t ′) pi ¬Gtr(b)[s]
r8 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)⇒pi Gta[s]
r9 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)¬sincere(a) pi ¬Gta[s]
r10 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Gtr(b)[s]⇒pi Gtb[s]
r11 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Gtr(b)[s]∧Btr(a)¬cooperative(b)
 pi ¬Gtb[s]
r12 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Gtr(a)[Gtr(b)[s]]⇒pi Gta[Gtb[s]]
r13 requestr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧Btr(b)insincere(a) pi ¬Gta[Gtb[s]]
3.3 Composed actions: propose
In our framework, it is relatively easy to model non-primitive com-
municative acts, which are defined in terms of other ones. For
example, following FIPA [2002], communicative acts propose and
accept are defined in terms of inform, using a set of constitutive
Br(b)reliable(a)
+∆uttera,b,r(propose,α, t)
−∆¬proposer(a),r(b)(α, t)
p1
+δproposer(a),r(b)(α, t)
p1
+∆informr(a),r(b)(Gr(b)(α)→t Gr(a)(α), t)
p3
+∆Br(a)(Gr(b)(α))→t Gr(a)(α)
i3
+∆¬(Gr(b)(α)→t−1 Br(b)Gr(a)(α))
i4
+∆¬(Br(b)¬(Gr(b)(α)→t−1 Gr(a)(α)))
i5
+∆Gr(a)(Gr(b)(α))→t Gr(a)Br(b)Gr(a)(α))
i6
+∆(Gr(b)(α)→t Br(b)Gr(a)(α))
i7
−∆¬(BaGr(b)(α)→t BaGr(a)(α))
i8
+δ (BaGr(b)(α)→t BaGr(a)(α))
i8
−∆(Bb(Gr(b)(α))→t BbGr(a)(α))
i10
+δ (Bb(Gr(b)(α))→t BbGr(a)(α))
i10
Figure 1: A proof for theory T .
rules Rprop = {p1, p2, p3,a1}. In this way, propose and accept in-
herit the feasibility preconditions and effect rules of inform. In the
following, assume that action α ∈ AA.
This kind of definition makes explicit use of the rule-based char-
acter of the logic. In rule p3 a proposal is defined as the announce-
ment of a conditional goal Gr(b)(α) →t Gr(a)(α). It means that
the speaker will adopt goal α , if the hearer indicates also to have
α as a goal, i.e., if the hearer accepts the proposal. In rule a1, an
acceptance is defined as an announcement of such an goal.
p1 uttera,b,r(propose,α, t)⇒τ proposer(a),r(b)(α, t)
p2 retracta,b,r(proposer(a),r(b)(α, t), t ′)
 τ ¬proposer(a),r(b)(α, t)
p3 proposer(a),r(b)(α, t)
→τ informr(a),r(b)(Gr(b)(α)→t Gr(a)(α), t)
a1 acceptr(a),r(b)(α, t)→τ in f ormr(a),r(b)(Gr(a)α, t)
By means of illustration, we construct a
proof for the defeasible ACL theory T =
〈T ,{Btr(b)reliable(a),uttera,b,r(propose,α, t)},{a,b},{r1,r2},
〈r(a) = r1,r(b) = r2〉,Rprop ∪Rinf ,Rprop ∪Rinf ,≺〉. The proof is
shown in Figure 1.
In the example, a propose has been uttered (+∆) and no evidence
can be non-defeasibly gathered (−∆) against the proposal: rule p2
is not applicable. So we defeasibly infer (+δ ) that propose holds
(rule p1). Rule p3 defeasibly derives that a corresponding inform
has been generated. From now on, rules concerning inform can be
applied. Rules i3− i5 strictly derive (+∆) the preconditions of the
inform. Due to Definition 8, the clause Br(a)[Gr(b)(α)→t Gr(a)(α)]
is first reduced to Br(a)[Gr(b)(α)] →t Br(a)[Gr(a)(α)] and then to
Br(a)(Gr(b)(α)) →t Gr(a)(α). Finally, the example derives (i10)
that the hearer also privately believes the conditional goal that the
speaker wants to do α , if the hearer wants that too.
3.4 Abstract communicative acts: inform-if
Like in FIPA, we can also handle abstract communicative acts,
like inform-if(a,b, p) which is composed of the nondeterministic
choice of inform(a,b, p) and inform(a,b,¬p). Note that in FIPA
inform-if is an abstract action which cannot directly be executed:
ii1 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)→τ inform-ifr(a),r(b)(s, t)
ii2 informr(a),r(b)(¬s, t)→τ inform-ifr(a),r(b)(s, t)
Thus, we can define query-if as a request to inform-if :
qi1 queryifr(a),r(b)(s, t)
→τ requestr(a),r(b)(inform-ifr(b),r(a)(s, t ′), t)
To satisfy the request, the receiver has to execute either an
informr(b),r(a)(s, t ′) or an informr(b),r(a)(¬s, t ′).
3.5 Persuasion dialogues
Agent communication languages are usually studied in relation to
specific dialogue types, such as cooperative information exchange,
negotiation or persuasion, see, e.g., the taxonomy of Walton and
Krabbe [1995]. Given the non-monotonic character of DL, we can
extend FIPA with persuasion, by defining acts like challenge and
concede.
Interestingly, a single communicative act like inform may have
different semantics, in different types of dialogue. This is due to
different background assumptions, for example regarding sincer-
ity, cooperativity, or trust. Thus, in uncooperative dialogue types
like persuasion or negotiation, it is possible to reverse the general
principle of rules i6− i13, that cooperative behavior is expected by
default, but can be overruled by evidence to the contrary.
Alternatively, we can follow the principle that “silence means
consent”. In a persuasion dialogue, the hearer is assumed to be-
lieve what the speaker said (adapted rule i′7), unless he explicitly
challenges the proposition (additional rule i′′7), thus defeating the
conclusion that he believes the content of the inform.
i′7 G
t
r(a)[B
t
r(b)[s]]⇒pi Btr(b)[s]
i′′7 informr(a),r(b)(s, t)∧ challenger(b),r(a)(s, t ′) pi ¬Btr(b)[s]
In addition to challenges, we can add explicit concessions (Wal-
ton and Krabbe [1995]). If an agent concedes to p, it does not
necessarily mean that he now believes p, but it means that he does
no longer believe the opposite. For example, it blocks the agent
from performing an inform that ¬s later in the interaction.
c1 conceder(a),r(b)(s, t)→pi ¬Btr(a)[¬s]
So for persuasion, the rules Rinf of Section 3.1 are altered as
follows: Rpersuasion = (Rinf \{i7})∪{i′7, i′′7 ,c1}, where i′′7  i′7.
4 Related work
Recently, some other papers went in the same direction of redefin-
ing FIPA semantics: e.g., Nickles et al. [2006]; Verdicchio and
Colombetti [2006]; Gaudou et al. [2006a]; Boella et al. [2006a,b].
Like us, most of them distinguish between public and private men-
tal attitudes. There are various differences.
Like in Boella et al. [2006a,b], the distinguishing feature of our
approach is that the public mental attitudes attributed to agents dur-
ing the dialogue are associated with roles. However, we use roles to
redefine the FIPA semantics in a non-monotonic framework based
on DL which allows us to extend FIPA to persuasion dialogue. We
distinguish interactive roles, such as speaker, (over)hearer and ad-
dressee. Clearly, different constitutive rules apply to speaker and
hearer. Further, we could add rules so that the effects of implicit
acknowledgement differ between the addressee of a message, and
a mere overhearer (Gaudou et al. [2006b]). Because social roles
are associated with dialogue types, with specific set of dialogue
rules, roles allow us to reason about assumptions in different kinds
of dialogues. E.g., sincerity could be assumed in cooperative dia-
logues, such as information exchange, but not in non-cooperative
dialogues, such as persuasion or negotiation. Ostensible beliefs
and the grounding operator distinguish only interactive roles or dif-
ferent groups of agents.
The importance of roles is recognized in multiagent systems and
their function ranges from attributing responsibilities to assigning
powers to agents in organizations.Other solutions, instead, need
to add to dialogue new theoretical concepts which are not always
completely clear or diverge from existing work. In particular, Gau-
dou et al. [2006a] use an explicit grounding operator, which only
partially overlaps with the tradition of grounding in theories of nat-
ural language dialogue. Opinions Nickles et al. [2006] are intro-
duced specifically for modelling dialogue, but with no relation with
persuasion and argumentation. Finally, commitments in Verdic-
chio and Colombetti [2006] overlap with obligations.
Moreover, the approaches relate to the well known FIPA seman-
tics in different degrees: Gaudou et al. [2006b] and Nickles et al.
[2006] try to stay close to the original semantics, as we do, while
Verdicchio and Colombetti [2006] substitute it entirely with a new
semantics, which, among other things, does not consider precon-
ditions of actions. Gaudou et al. [2006a] and Nickles et al. [2006]
use modal logic, and Verdicchio and Colombetti [2006] use CTL.
They thus use more common frameworks, but they do not con-
sider the computational properties of their proposals. DL, instead,
may provide us with a proof theory which is linear (cf. Governa-
tori et al. [2006a]). Moreover, most of the other approaches do not
consider the persistence of preconditions and effects, an essential
point when dealing with actions and their effects. Time introduces
most of the complexities in our formal system, but time is crucial
for agent communication, because speech acts are uttered one after
the other, but their effects on mental attitudes are persistent.
5 Summary
We introduce a defeasible logic for role-based agent communica-
tion and have shown how to formalize the essential features of
FIPA semantics on public mental states, including composed and
abstract actions. Moreover, we have shown how it can be extended
to reason about different assumptions about agents in coopera-
tive dialogue, like information exchange, and non-cooperative di-
alogue, like persuasion and negotiation. We use the logic to study
the non-monotonic and rule-based character of role based agent
communication.
Non-monotonic reasoning occurs in reasoning about the persis-
tence in time of the effects of speech acts. Moreover, whereas
FIPA makes strong assumptions about the private states, the alter-
native of using public mental attitudes does not make any assump-
tions about them; using non-monotonic reasoning we can make
inferences about the private mental attitudes of the communicat-
ing agents which hold only by default and can always be revised
by new information. Moreover, non-monotonic reasoning can be
used for challenges and concessions. E.g., an inform is accepted –
i.e., its content becomes part of the public beliefs of the addressee
– unless it is challenged. Finally, non-monotonic reasoning can be
used to deal with persuasion and negotiation, where old arguments
can be retracted or overridden by stronger ones.
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